Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEL AV 04941 01 OF 02 140806Z
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 OMB-01 AID-05 SSM-03 ACDA-12 MCT-01
/111 W
----------007219 140932Z /21
P R 131516Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2554
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCEUR
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 4941

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, IS, US, EG
SUBJ: DAYAN MEETING WITH NWC/ICAF GROUP

1. SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN MET WITH NWC/ICAF GROUP ON APRIL 12 FOR WIDE-RANGING ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION. REFERRING TO THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, DAYAN WAS NOT SURE THE RECENT IDF OPERATION WAS THE ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM. SOLUTION WOULD BE ESTABLISHMENT OF STABLE GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON WHICH COULD ENSURE--LIKE EGYPT, SYRIA AND JORDAN--THAT NO TERROR-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 04941 01 OF 02 140806Z

IST OPERATIONS ORIGINATED FROM ITS TERRITORY. HOWEVER, ALL DAYAN COULD SUGGEST WITH REGARD TO LEBANON WAS SPEEDING UP THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LEBANESE ARMY. HE WAS DOUBTFUL THAT UNIFIL WAS AN ANSWER TO THE GOVERNMENTAL VACUUM IN LEBANON OR COULD TAKE THE PLACE OF A LEBANESE ARMY. HE ALSO QUESTIONED WHETHER SYRIAN DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTH LEBANON WAS A VIABLE SOLUTION AND WAS CLEARLY NEGATIVE REGARDING SUCH A MOVE. DAYAN ALSO DID NOT BELIEVE IT

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DECOUPLE THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT FROM THE WEST BANK ISSUE. HE DOUBTED CAIRO WOULD GO MUCH FURTHER TOWARD A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL WITHOUT GETTING SOMETHING ON THE WEST BANK. DAYAN ALSO STATED THE GOI HAD NOT CHANGED ITS LEGAL POSITION ON RES. 242. ISRAEL CONTINUED TO ACCEPT 242 AND 338 AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND CONCLUDING PEACE TREATIES WITH THE ARAB STATES. HOWEVER, WHILE THE FORMER GOVERNMENT FAVORED TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE, THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT PROPOSED SELF-RULE. DAYAN AGREED THAT THE U.S. WAS A NECESSARY PARTNER IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND THAT, LEFT TO THEMSELVES, ISRAEL AND EGYPT COULD NOT ACHIEVE PEACE. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION REGARDING GUARANTEEING A PEACE SETTLEMENT, DAYAN STATED HE PERSONALLY FAVORED A MILITARY SECURITY TREATY WITH THE U.S. ALONG THE FORM OF NATO. ALTHOUGH SUCH A TREATY WOULD LEAD TO PRACTICAL CHANGES IN ISRAELI VIEWS ON SECURITY, ISRAEL STILL WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO RETURN TO THE OLD 1967 BORDER ON THE WEST BANK. IN ANY CASE, DAYAN DID NOT WANT AMERICANS IN UNIFORM OR CIVILIANS (SUCH AS AT SFM) TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN ISRAEL'S DEFENSES. ISRAEL HAD TO DEFEND ITSELF WITH ITS OWN SOLDIERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, DAYAN WOULD WELCOME A U.S. MILITARY BASE IN ISRAEL, EVEN WITHOUT A SECURITY TREATY.
END SUMMARY

2. FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN HELD ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD WITH VISITING NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE/INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES GROUP ON APRIL 12. THE MAIN TOPICS OF DISCUSSION FOLLOW.
CONFIDENTIAL

3. LEBANON. DAYAN WAS NOT SURE THAT THE RECENT IDF OPERATION WAS THE ANSWER TO THE SECURITY THREAT FACING ISRAEL FROM THE PLO IN LEBANON. ON THE OTHER HAND, STRICTLY DEFENSIVE MEASURES COULD NOT ELIMINATE PLO ACTIONS EITHER. THE REAL SOLUTION WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STABLE GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON WHICH COULD ENSURE--LIKE EGYPT, SYRIA AND JORDAN--THAT NO TERRORIST OPERATIONS ORIGINATED FROM ITS TERRITORY. HOWEVER, THERE WAS CURRENTLY NO EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT OR AUTHORITY IN LEBANON. DAYAN ADDED THAT HE WAS DOUBTFUL THAT A UN FORCE WAS AN ANSWER TO THE GOVERNMENTAL VACUUM THERE. UNIFIL DOES NOT HAVE ORDERS TO USE FORCE AGAINST UNLAWFUL ACTS OR AUTHORITY TO OPEN FIRE AGAINST TERRORISTS TRYING TO RETURN TO THE SOUTH. UNIFIL COULD NOT TAKE THE PLACE OF A LEBANESE ARMY. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. COULD HELP SPEED THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LEBANESE ARMY SO THE GOL WILL HAVE A FORCE WITH WHICH TO ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY. DAYAN ALSO QUESTIONED WHETHER SYRIAN DEPLOYMENT TO THE SOUTH WAS A VIABLE SOLUTION. HE DID NOT WANT TO SEE THE SYRIANS SITTING ON ANOTHER FRONT WITH ISRAEL BECAUSE SYRIA SUPPORTED THE PLO, DID NOT ACCEPT UNSC RES. 242 AND DID NOT WANT PEACE. THE ANSWER TO THE LEBANESE SITUATION WAS TO HAVE LEBANESE, RATHER THAN FOREIGNERS, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR COUNTRY.

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEL AV 04941 02 OF 02 141535Z
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 OMB-01 AID-05 SSM-03 ACDA-12 MCT-01
/111 W
----------014202 141545Z /50/21
P R 131516Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2555
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCEUR
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 4941

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

4. NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT AND WEST BANK ISSUE. DAYAN DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DECOUPLE THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT FROM THE WEST BANK ISSUE. ISRAEL WAS READY TO WORK OUT AN ARRANGEMENT FOR THE SINAI AND A PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT BUT CAIRO WAS UNWILLING. DAYAN DID NOT BELIEVE EGYPT WOULD GO MUCH FURTHER TOWARD A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL WITHOUT GETTING SOMETHING ON THE WEST BANK.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 04941 02 OF 02 141535Z

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

5. RESOLUTION 242. DAYAN DENIED THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT HAD CHANGED THE GOI'S LEGAL POSITION ON 242. ISRAEL ACCEPTED 242 AND 338 AS BASES FOR NEGOTIATION AND CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATIES WITH THE NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES. ISRAEL DID NOT WANT TO EXCLUDE JORDAN FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS AND HAS NOT REJECTED RES. 242. HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE IN GOI POLICY ON THE WEST BANK RATHER THAN ON ITS INTERPRETATION OF 242. THE FORMER GOVERNMENT FAVORED TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE IN THE FORM OF THE ALLON PLAN. THE ARABS NEVER ACCEPTED THIS PROPOSAL AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT PROPOSED SELF-RULE WITHOUT THE ANNEXATION OF ANY PART OF THE WEST BANK. AFTER FIVE YEARS THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND DISPOSAL OF THE TERRITORY COULD BE DISCUSSED. HOWEVER, THE SELF-RULE PROPOSAL IS NOT AN ULTIMATUM. IF THE ARABS HAVE ANOTHER PLAN LET THEM TABLE IT. ISRAEL IS OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS. IF THE ARABS PUT ANOTHER PROPOSAL ON THE TABLE ISRAEL WILL DISCUSS IT.

6. U.S. ROLE IN NEGOTIATING PROCESS. DAYAN AGREED WITH SADAT THAT THE U.S. WAS A NECESSARY PARTNER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. LEFT TO THEMSELVES, ISRAEL AND EGYPT COULD NOT ACHIEVE PEACE. WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF A THIRD PARTY--THE U.S.--NO PROGRESS COULD BE MADE. THIS IS BECAUSE THE U.S. IS IMPARTIAL AND NOT A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT. IT HAS NO INTERESTS IN THE SPECIFICS OF ANY AGREEMENT AS LONG AS IT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES INVOLVED. HOWEVER, THE U.S. MUST BE MORE THAN AN HONEST BROKER. THE U.S. MUST BE A PARTNER WILLING TO INVEST IN THE PEACE PROCESS. SMALL COUNTRIES SUCH AS EGYPT AND ISRAEL CANNOT BE VIABLE WITHOUT A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH A SUPERPOWER. THIS CAN TAKE THE FORM OF A TREATY OR OTHER ARRANGEEMENT. IN ANY CASE, THE U.S. WILL HAVE TO COMMIT ITSELF, PERHAPS BY SUPERVISING A PEACE SETTLEMENT AS WELL AS PROVIDING ASSISTANCE IN ECONOMIC AND OTHER FIELDS.

7. AIRCRAFT PACKAGE DEAL. DAYAN THOUGHT THAT THE
CONFIDENTIAL

QUESTION OF ARMS FOR EGYPT COULD HAVE BEEN LINKED TO A PEACE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, HE DISAGREED OVER LINKING THE SUPPLY OF F-15S TO ISRAEL TO PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. ISRAEL HAD A NORTHERN FRONT TO BE CONCERNED WITH AS WELL AS ITS FRONT WITH EGYPT. HE SUGGESTED THAT IF THE U.S. FELT ISRAEL HAD TOO MANY FORCES ON THE EGYPTIAN FRONT IT TELL JERUSALEM THAT THIS IS AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE. THE U.S. CAN BEHAVE SIMILARLY WITH EGYPT. DAYAN ALSO SPECULATED THAT HE WOULD NOT MIND THE U.S. BEING AWARE OF ISRAELI MILITARY PLANNING AND SEEING WHERE ISRAELI TANKS WERE MOVED. WHATEVER ISRAEL COULD DO TO MAINTAIN A PEACEFUL SOUTHERN FRONT--EVEN WITHOUT A FORMAL TREATY--WAS DESIRABLE.

8. SECURITY TREATY WITH U.S. DAYAN STATED THAT GIVING UP TERRITORY FOR A GUARANTEED PEACE RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHO WOULD

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

GUARANTEE THAT PEACE. THE UN COULD NOT AND HE WOULD NOT RELY ON IT. HOWEVER, DAYAN STATED THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVORED A MILITARY SECURITY TREATY WITH THE U.S. ALONG THE FORM OF NATO. THEN, IF ISRAEL'S BORDERS WERE CROSSED, THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION. HE RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH A TREATY WOULD BE VERY COMPLICATED DUE TO THE CONGRESSIONAL FACTOR. HOWEVER, THE BELIEVED THAT A TREATY COULD BE VERY SIGNIFICANT AND A GOOD DETERRENT. HOWEVER, DAYAN DID NOT WANT AMERICANS IN UNIFORM OR CIVILIANS (SUCH AS AT SFM) PLAYING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN ISRAEL'S DEFENSES. ISRAEL'S HAD TO TAKE CARE OF ITSELF WITH ITS OWN SOLDIERS.

9. DAYAN NOTED THAT A TREATY WITH THE U.S. WOULD LEAD TO PRACTICAL CHANGES IN THE ISRAELI VIEW OF SECURITY. THERE WOULD BE A GREAT DIFFERENCE IN THE SITUATION IF THE U.S. TOOK RESPONSIBILITY FOR SHARM AL SHAYKH AND GUARANTEED FREE NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF EILAT. HE WOULD RELY ON SUCH A TREATY FOR THE SECURITY OF SHARM. HE WOULD ALSO RECOMMEND A PULL BACK FROM THE SINAI. FURTHERMORE, A TREATY WOULD TAKE CARE OF THE WIDER INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF ANY NEW CONFLICT. ON THE OTHER HAND, ISRAEL WOULD NOT RETURN TO THE OLD BORDER ON THE WEST BANK EVEN WITH SUCH A TREATY. ISRAEL REQUIRED EARLY WARNING STATIONS ON THE WEST BANK AND MUST HAVE ISRAELI SOLDIERS PATROLLING ALONG THE JORDAN. ANY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSAL BASED ON AMERICANS TAKING CARE OF ISRAEL IS NOT APPROPRIATE. ISRAELI SOLDIERS SHOULD DEFEND ISRAEL'S BORDERS.

10. U.S. BASE IN ISRAEL. DAYAN STATED HE WAS ALL FOR A U.S. MILITARY BASE IN ISRAEL, EVEN WITHOUT A MILITARY SECURITY TREATY.

11. COMMENT: DAYAN WAS VERY FRANK IN HIS RESPONSES AND THE NWC/ICAF GROUP FOUND THE SESSION VERY REWARDING. WE WERE SURPRISED BY DAYAN'S WILLINGNESS TO EXPRESS HIS DOUBTS ABOUT THE UTILITY OF THE IDF OPERATION INTO LEBANON AND PRESUME THAT HIS MISGIVINGS PARTIALLY EXPLAIN HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO INVOLVE HIMSELF IN DISCUSSIONS WITH US ON THIS SUBJECT. IN ADDITION, WASHINGTON READERS MAY NOT BE SURPRISED BY DAYAN'S SUPPORT FOR A U.S.-ISRAEL MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY, BUT THIS IS PROBABLY THE FIRST TIME HE HAS DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH SUCH A LARGE AND SEMI-OFFICIAL FORUM.
LEWIS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETINGS, MILITARY SCHOOLS, COMBAT OPERATIONS, REPRISALS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978TELAV04941
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780160-0675
Format: TEL
From: TEL AVIV
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780458/aaaabxhy.tel
Line Count: 268
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: e857a1b0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2972053
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DAYAN MEETING WITH NWC/ICAF GROUP
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, IS, US, EG, NWC, (DAYAN, MOSHE)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/e857a1b0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014